Abstract-This note deals with linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential games including time preference rates with an open-loop information structure. The properties of the characteristic matrix associated with the necessary conditions for a Stackelberg strategy are pointed out. It is shown that such a matrix exhibits a special symmetry property of its eigenvalues. Sufficient conditions to guarantee a predefined degree of stability are given based on the distribution of the eigenvalues in the complex plane.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE STACKELBERG strategies are an elegant concept for dealing with hierarchical differential games [1] , [2] . In the framework of an open-loop information structure [3] , the necessary conditions are well known and could be obtained explicitly within the context of linear-quadratic problems [1] , [2] . Nevertheless, it seems that an explicit solution, coping with differential games with criteria including time preference rates, does not exist.
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be restated as a standard one with a shift of the eigenvalues of the drift matrix by α. The reformulation uses a change of variable, which is closely connected with asymptotic stability of degree α. Besides, a criterion with a time preference rate is quite frequent especially in economic applications of game theory (see [5] , [6] for more details) and are recognized as the discount rate associated with the cost functionals. In order to emphasize the fact that each player has its own objective, the time preference rates are not necessarily identical [8] .
When there is no time preference rate, the necessary conditions for obtaining an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium are characterized by a Hamiltonian matrix (see [9] - [11] for an overview). This leads to a symmetry of the eigenvalues with respect to the origin of the complex plane. However, for the general case where time preference rates are different and not null, this property does not hold. The main contribution of this note is to consider such a general case. Two points are examined. First, the eigenvalues distribution of the characteristic matrix associated with an open-loop Stackelberg strategy applied on the differential game is studied. Second, it is shown that a predefined degree of stability could be imposed to the controlled system.
The note is organized as follows. In Section II, the Stackelberg strategy with an open-loop information structure is recalled and the associated necessary conditions are derived. The cases of finite and infinite time horizon are considered. The characteristic matrix and the corresponding coupled Riccati equations are presented. A nontrivial symmetry for the eigenvalues is described in Section III. Sufficient conditions for a strict α-stability are provided in the same section, followed by an interpretation in terms of game theory. An example illustrates the main result. Some concluding remarks make up Section IV.
II. STACKELBERG STRATEGY

A. Problem Statement
Consider a two-players linear-quadratic differential game on a finite time horizon, defined bẏ
where
is the admissible set of the controls u i ) and with the cost functionals J i (i ∈ {1, 2}) including a time preference rate α i
where x f = x(t f ). All weighting matrices are constant and symmetric
, and R ii > 0. The matrices C i are of full rank C i ∈ R m i ×n . Stackelberg strategy with an open-loop information structure is applied for the differential game (1)-(2). Player 2 is assumed to be the leader while player 1 is the follower. The hierarchy in the game comes from the fact that the leader knows the rational reaction of the follower and reveals first his/her strategy. The follower does not know the rational reaction of the leader and must optimize his/her criterion J 1 for a given control u * 2 (t) of the leader. Define the rational reaction set of the follower R 1 (u)
For a differential game with an open-loop information structure [12] , i.e., the players are committed to follow a predetermined strategy or no 
(4) The necessary conditions for a Stackelberg strategy with an open-loop information structure were derived in [1] and [2] (see also [5, ch. 5] for application in economy). Let ψ 1 be the costate vector of the follower associated with the dynamic constraint (1) and ψ 2 and γ, the costate vectors of the leader, associated, with the dynamic constraint (1) and the rational reaction set of the follower R 1 (·). The open-loop Stackelberg controls are u *
and the transversality conditions are
The notations (6) and (8) characterizes the two-point boundary value problem, in association with conditions (7) . Note that for α 1 = α 2 = 0, one can recognize the Hamiltonian structure of M α 1 α 2 = M 0 , 0 pointed out in [9] .
These necessary conditions are also sufficient if the criteria are convex for a finite time horizon [1] , [2] . In the following sections, the determination of the open-loop Stackelberg controls is examined for both finite and infinite time horizon cases.
B. Criteria on a Finite Horizon
The linearity of the differential equation (6) and of the transversality conditions (7) with respect to x(t), and x(t 0 ) allows research of Stackelberg controls u * 1 (t) and u * 2 (t) as following. Let us find K 1 (t), K 2 (t), and P (t) verifying
From (8) and (9), we obtain the Riccati differential equations to be verified by K 1 (t), K 2 (t), and P (t)
In this case, the Stackelberg controls can be formulated as
These controls are not functions of the measurement of the state x(t) but of the predetermined state ξ(t, t 0 )x 0 , function of time.
The coupled Riccati equations (10) are associated with the matrix M α 1 α 2 . In fact, by decomposing M α 1 α 2 into submatrices as
we could rewrite (10) as a single nonsymmetric Riccati equation
Such an equation could be solved using the representation formula of solutions of Riccati equations [10] .
C. Criteria on an Infinite Horizon
In this section, the particular case of infinite horizon t f → +∞ is considered. Since only stabilizing controls are considered, the terminal costs 1/2x T f e 2 α i t f K if x f in criteria (2) and the transversality conditions (7) become irrelevant.
With criteria on infinite horizon, it is possible to look for only constant solutions of (14), by replacing the left-hand side of (14) by an extended zero matrix. Some necessary conditions of existence of solution of this equation are developped in [13] .
If K 1 , K 2 , and P are constant solutions of the coupled Riccati equations (10), the n eigenvalues of (A − S 1 K 1 − S 2 K 2 ) are included in the 4n of M α 1 α 2 . A method to find all solutions K 1 ,K 2 , and P of the coupled Riccati equations is to study the invariant subspaces of the matrix M α 1 α 2 , with the form (see [10] and [13] for more details)
Therefore, the distribution of the eigenvalues of M α 1 α 2 has to be studied.
III. EIGENVALUES SYMMETRY AND CONDITIONS FOR STRICT α 2 -STABILITY
In this section, first a property of symmetry of the matrix M α 1 α 2 is emphasized.
Theorem 1 (Symmetry):
Proof: Let
(15) By noting
it is easy to verify that
which proves that (M α 1 α 2 + α 2 I 4 n ) is an Hamiltonian matrix. This Hamiltonian symmetry property depends only on α 2 , the time preference rate of the leader. The hierarchical structure of the game allows the leader to impose his time preference rate to the system (1). The follower's time preference rate does not influence the symmetry. It may be seen as a further degree of freedom in the control design. To obtain a α-degree of stability, one should only impose α 2 ≤ α.
It is well known that for a Hamiltonian matrix, if λ is an eigenvalue,
−λ
* is also an eigenvalue. Here, matrix (M α 1 α 2 + α 2 I 4 n ) is Hamiltonian and real. Therefore, the matrix M α 1 α 2 admits the point (−α 2 ; 0) as a center of symmetry in the complex plane for its eigenvalues distribution. However, it is possible that eigenvalues of matrix M α 1 α 2 have a real part equal to −α 2 . To guarantee an exponential convergence rate of degree greater than α 2 for the system (12), one should prove that at least n eigenvalues of M α 1 ,α 2 are located to the left of the vertical symmetry axis −α 2 + jR. In the following, the sufficient conditions for strict α 2 -stability, associated with this Hamiltonian symmetry, are studied. By noting λ k (k ∈ {1, . . . , 4n}) , the 4n eigenvalues of M α 1 α 2 , a permutation allows having
(16) In the case, α 1 = α 2 = 0, the relation
is obtained if the pairs (C 1 , A) and (C 2 , A) are detectable and (A, B 1 ) is stabilizable [10] . The presence of eigenvalues on the vertical symmetry axis means that a predefined stability of degree α 2 cannot be guaranteed. Sufficient conditions to ensure that
are derived hereafter. The proof of the main theorem requires two lemmas. Lemma 1: Assuming that R < 0 and W < 0, the Hamiltonian matrix
does not admit imaginary eigenvalue if: 1) the pair (E, P ) does not admit imaginary unobservable mode; 2) the pair (P, D) does not admit imaginary uncontrolable mode. This lemma is well known in LQ problems. A sketch of the proof can be found, for example, in [10, p. 59] .
Lemma 2 (Sylvester's inequality): Let U 1 and U 2 be q × w and w × p matrices with coefficients in the same field. Then, by noting ρ(U 1 ) the rank of the matrix U 1 , one has
A proof of Sylvester's inequality can be found in [14] . Theorem 2 (general strict α 2 -stability): For each couple (α 1 , α 2 ) ∈ R 2 , the relation (18) is verified under the sufficient conditions: 1) the pair (C 1 , A + (2α 1 − α 2 )I n ) does not admit imaginary unobservable mode; 2) the pair (C 2 , A + α 2 I n ) does not admit imaginary unobservable mode; 3) the pair (A + (2α 1 − α 2 )I n , B 1 ) does not admit imaginary uncontrolable mode; 4) and furthermore, if α 1 = α 2 , it is assumed that m 1 ≤ r 2 and that the triplet (A + α 2 I n , B 2 , C 1 ) does not admit imaginary transition zero. Proof: In order to avoid imaginary eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian matrix (M α 1 α 2 + α 2 I 4 n ), the Lemma 1 and the Hautus approach are used. The matrix (M α 1 α 2 + α 2 I 4 n ) defined by (15) does not admit imaginary eigenvalues if for all ω ∈ R,
2) ρ
The aforementioned matrices are rearranged to show Hautus matrices
The conditions 2) and 3) in Theorem 2 lead to
Now, the condition on the pair
with
and
Condition 2) in theorem 2 gives ρ(U 1 ) = 2n and condition 4) gives ρ(U 2 ) = 2n + m 1 . The Sylvester's inequality in Lemma 2 allows verification that ρ(U 1 U 2 ) = 2n. Remark 1: It is noteworthy that for the case α 1 = α 2 = α, the condition about the imaginary transition zero is redundant. Matrix A α ,α is Hamiltonian. From Lemma 1, (C 1 , A + αI n ) has no imaginary unobservable mode and (A + αI n ) has no imaginary uncontrollable mode that is enough to guarantee thatÃ α ,α − jωI 2 n is invertible for every ω ∈ R and that
without consideration of the triplet (A + αI n , B 2 , C 1 ).
Remark 2: Condition 4) can be interpreted in a game-theoretic sense. In fact, this triplet corresponds to nonsymmetric coupling between players. The action of the leader (matrix B 2 ) on the system (matrix A) can be viewed by the follower (matrix C 1 ), if there is no imaginary transition zero. Note that if m 1 < r 2 holds, there are also follower's outputs with respect to the number of leader's inputs. Then, the leader is not able to impose arbitrarily all the outputs of the follower. The leader is not omnipotent anymore. That is why, m 1 ≤ r 2 is required.
Remark 3: It is worth noting that in all cases for α 1 and α 2 , no conditions on the pair (A, B 2 ) are assumed. The controllability or only the stabilizability of the pair (A, B 2 ) of the leader does not influence the main result. This emphasizes the privileged position of the leader.
In order to illustrate the main result, the following example is taken:
The pairs (C 1 , A) and (C 2 , A) are observable, and the pair (A, B 1 ) is controlable. The different conditions (except the condition about the imaginary zero transmission) of Theorem 2 are verified for all α 1 and α 2 . The distribution of eigenvalues is computed for the couple (α 1 , α 2 ) = (1, 2) to illustrate the main result of symmetry. This couple verifies that the triplet (A + α 2 I n , B 2 , C 1 ) does not admit imaginary eigenvalue. To sum up, all assumptions of Theorem 2 are verified. In Fig. 1 , the eigenvalues of M α 1 α 2 are represented. It is obvious that the α 2 -translated imaginary axis is an axis of symmetry for the distribution of eigenvalues. Moreover, there is no eigenvalue on this axis of symmetry, as claimed in Theorem 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the linear-quadratic games including time preference rates in the framework of Stackelberg strategy with an open-loop information structure are studied. The general case of different time preference rates is considered. It is shown that the time preference rate of the leader imposes the symmetry of the eigenvalues of the characteristic matrix associated with the necessary conditions. Also, sufficient conditions to guarantee a strict α-stability for this type of differential games are derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
Switched dynamical systems are hybrid systems with both continuous dynamics and discrete elements. When the switching mechanism is unknown and unmeasurable, it is usually taken as a perturbation that can arbitrarily change within its range. The stability is thus the guaranteed stability under arbitrary switching. It has been established that global uniform asymptotic stability is equivalent to the existence of a common Lyapunov function that is positive definite, smooth, and strictly decreasing along any nontrivial state trajectory of each subsystem [19] , [26] , [28] . For switched linear systems, several well-known sets of functions (e.g., piecewise linear functions and polynomials) have been proven to be universal in the sense that each asymptotically stable switched linear system admits a common Lyapunov function that belongs to the set [12] , [31] , [33] . Due to this tight connection between asymptotic stability and common Lyapunov functions, numerous efforts have been paid to find various common Lyapunov functions for different classes of switched linear systems [1] , [15] , [25] .
In comparison with asymptotic stability, marginal stability received relatively little attention, despite the fact that this type of stability is both practically important and academically challenging [5] , [6] . Indeed, marginal stability is desirable in many practical issues as it keeps the system stable on one hand and is closely related to periodic solutions and limit cycles on the other hand [7] , [8] . A typical example is the helicopter guidance on spiral trajectories [32] . For a switched nonlinear system, its local stability is consistent with that of its linearized approximation if the later is exponentially convergent or divergent, but inconsistency may occur when the linearized system is marginally stable or marginally unstable. In this sense, marginal stability plays a unique role in the local stability analysis for switched nonlinear systems.
For switched systems under arbitrary switching, marginal stability means that the most destablizing switching signal steers the system trajectory bounded but not convergent. For lower order switched linear systems, the most destabilzing switching strategy can be explicitly characterized or computed [24] , [29] , [30] , which provides verifiable criteria for marginal stability. As the system dimension increases, the
